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Abstract: 
 
This research aims to observe the consequences of going concern opinion (GCO) and 
examine the role of specialist accounting firms for the financial reports of business firms and 
capital markets. The research is based on an experimental study consisting of 107 
undergraduate and graduate students who were asked to act as financial analysts.  
The GCO consequence for the financial reports of business firms is that the stock price of the 
corresponding firms will decline, but the decline will be smaller if the financial reports are 
audited by specialist accounting firms. The GCO consequence for rival firms is that the stock 
prices of the rival firms will rise if other companies in the same industry receive GCO, but the 
increase will be smaller if the companies receiving GCO are audited by specialized 
accounting firms.  
The GCO consequences of the capital markets is that the stock prices of all companies, the 
composite index and the market participants will increase, but the presence of a specialized 
accounting firm has not been proven to strengthen the market participants’ willingness to 
participate further in the stock market. 
Keywords: Going concern opinion (GCO), financial reports, specialized industry auditor, 
stock price of firms, composite index, market participants. 
JEL Codes: M41, M48 
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1. Introduction  
 
Based on SA (Audit Standard) Section 570-Business Continuity (IAPI, 2013) in 
Indonesia, auditors are allowed to publish opinions that contain a description of the 
auditors’ doubts on a company’s ability to maintain its viability. This opinion is 
known as going concern opinion (GCO). The conditions and events that trigger the 
auditors to issue GCO are also stated in the SA 570. 
 
Tuttle and Vandervelde (2009) stated that studies which investigate the possible of 
GCO roles in the stabilization of the stock price in a capital market or in the 
enhancement of the credibility of financial statements for other companies not 
receiving GCO are still rare. There has been no study that simultaneously examines 
the GCO consequences for announcing firms, rival firms, and the overall capital 
market using the same data source. Therefore, this study aims to simultaneously 
examine the consequences of GCO for announcing firms, rival firms and the capital 
market. 
 
Researches on the consequences of GCO for announcing firms generally show that 
according to investors GCO is relevant to assess the company's stock. O'Reilly 
(2010), who examined the consequences of GCO for announcing firms, states that 
announcing firms experienced a significant decline in their stock prices. Stock-price 
estimation made by investors' experiences a greater reduction when a company 
receives GCO than when it  receives an unqualified opinion. This indicates that GCO 
seems to be bad news for announcing firms. 
 
GCO consequences for rival firms indicate one of two phenomena, namely either 
competitive effect or contagion effect. Competitive effect occurs when rival firms in 
the same industry receive the positive impact of  a company’s  GCO (indicated by the 
increase of the rival firms’ stock prices). The contagion effect occurs when rival 
firms in the same industry obtain the negative impact of a company’s GCO (indicated 
by the decrease of their stock prices). The possibility as to whether the competitive 
effect can be turned into a contagion effect has been  rarely investigated. This study 
used an experimental method to manipulate the number of GCOs that exist in every 
industry. Thus, this study should give light to whether when the number of GCOs in 
an industry increases the benefits obtained by rival firms decrease 
 
Researches on the GCO consequences for the capital market as a whole have been 
rarely conducted due to the difficulty in obtaining the required data. Therefore, Tuttle 
and Vanderveldes (2009) used an experimental method to manipulate GCO by 
making two experimental markets (market with GCO and market without GCO). A 
market with GCO is a capital market in which GCO is observed and a market without 
GCO is a capital market in which no GCO is observed. In the market with GCO, only 
companies with GCO experience declining stock prices. . This shows that GCO can 
play an important role in the stabilization of stock prices. On the other hand, in the 
market without GCO, all of the companies’ stock prices decline, with no regard to 
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whether these companies deserve the stock price decline or not. This happens 
because  a market without GCO has a higher degree of uncertainty than a market with 
GCO. 
 
Researches on GCO have rarely considered the consequences of auditor reputation, 
which might act as a moderating variable. Auditor reputation in this study is proxied 
by the size of the accounting firms. Based on the research conducted by Morris and 
Strawser (1999), banking companies receiving a modified opinion from the large-size 
accounting firms tend to continue their business (because bank regulators do not stop 
their operation) On the other hand, banking companies, which receive a modified 
opinion from a small-size accounting firm tend not to be able to continue their 
business (the bank regulator stops their operation). This suggests that large 
accounting firms have  good reputation in the eyes of stakeholders. Good reputation 
can bring an economic value for the clients. The economic value in this case is that 
the regulator does not stop their operation, though they  are experiencing financial 
distress. 
 
Large accounting firms can be said to be superior to small accounting firms. It can 
be seen from their better resources, better technology audits, and better motivation to 
work with a high level of professionalism (Sawan and Alsaqqa, 2013). The research 
conducted by Sawan and Alsaqqa (2013) also shows that investors and creditors are 
more interested in cooperating with companies audited by large accounting firms. 
Based on the research conducted by Naslmosavi et al. (2013), the larger the size of a 
firm, the higher the quality of its human resources. 
 
This research is expected to contribute to theoretical and methodological 
contributions. There are three expected theoretical contributions. First, this study 
simultaneously examines the consequences of GCO for announcing firms, rival firms 
and capital markets as a whole by using the same data source. Previous studies 
generally examined the consequences of GCO only for announcing firms and rival 
firms. Second, this study uses the size of the accounting firms as a moderating 
variable. Previous studies have not considered the size of the accounting firms as a 
moderating variable. Third, this study observes whether the competitive effect can be 
turned into a contagion effect. This study uses an experimental method to manipulate 
the number of GCO that exist in every industry.  
 
Thus, it will be known whether at the time when the frequency of GCO increases in 
an industry the benefits obtained by rival firms will decrease. The methodological 
contribution of this research is that this present research examines the consequences 
of GCO with an experimental method with two experimental markets, namely the 
market with GCO and the market without GCO. The use of the experimental method 
expectedly can handle the difficulty in finding a market without GCO, which is hard 
to find in the real world setting. 
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2. Theory Overview and Hypothesis Development 
 
2.1 Theory Overview 
 
The essence of signaling theory is how accounting can be used to give signals about 
the condition of the company. Managers of companies that perform well will try to 
show a good signal to stakeholders. On the other hand, managers of less well-
performing companies also have an incentive to show unfavorable signal to 
stakeholders to maintain the company's credibility in the capital markets (Godfrey et 
al., 2010; Anikina et al., 2016; Averina et al., 2016; Kosinova et al., 2016). 
Investors’ response to the signal is reflected in the increase or decrease in the 
company’s stock price. 
 
In relation to the viability of the company, the auditor may issue GCO if the audited 
client experiences a condition and an event contained in the SA Section 570-Business 
Continuity. In these circumstances, GCO has the role as a signal containing 
information about the company’s doubtful survival. According to O'Reilly (2010), 
GCO has the role as an informational signal if the auditor is in a position with a 
higher ability to assess the viability of the client company in comparison to other 
parties, and if the auditor will produce negative consequences if it does not publish 
GCO. 
 
2.2 Hypothesis Development 
 
2.2.1 GCO and Stock Price Announcing firms 
In general, announcing firms obtain negative consequences when receiving GCO 
(Elliott et al., 2006; Schaub, 2006; O’Reilly et al., 2006; O'Reilly, 2010; Carson et 
al., 2012; Coelho et al., 2012; Amin et al., 2014). O’Reilly et al. (2006) and O'Reilly 
(2010) showed that GCO negatively affect the stock-price estimation. Based on these 
studies, the stock price estimation of announcing firms made by financial analysts is 
lower when the auditor issues GCO than when the auditor issues an unqualified 
opinion. Based on the above explanation, a hypothesis is formulated as follows: 
 
H1a:  Stock price estimation of announcing firms made by the financial analysts is 
lower when the auditor issues GCO than when the auditor issues an 
unqualified opinion 
 
2.2.2 GCO, Stock Price of Announcing firms and Auditor Reputation 
The moderating variable used in this study is the auditor reputation, which is proxied 
by the size of the accounting firm. Large accounting firms (big four accounting 
firms) can be said to be superior to small-sized accounting firms (non-big four 
accounting firms). This can be seen from their better resources, better technology 
audits, and better motivation to work with a high level of professionalism (Sawan and 
Alsaqqa, 2013).  
 
   D. Hapsoro 
 
 
213 
 
Based on research conducted by Naslmosavi et al. (2013), the larger the size of the 
firm, the higher the quality of their human resources. Thus, the size of the firm is 
expected to provide economic value for announcing firms as the companies which 
are experiencing financial distress. The economic value in this case has the potential 
to minimize the negative consequences to be received by announcing firm. Based on 
the above explanation, a hypothesis is formulated as follows: 
 
H1b:  The accounting firm’s size can weaken the negative effect of GCO on stock 
prices of an announcing firm 
 
2.2.3 GCO and Stock Price of Rival Firms 
Elliott et al. (2006) and Coelho et al. (2012) showed that at the moment when some 
companies receive GCO in an industry, investor will move their business and their 
holdings to rival firms. The rival firms, then experience increased stock prices. Thus, 
Elliott et al. (2006) showed more support to the competitive effect than the contagion 
effect. This indicates that GCO is good news for rival firms. Based on the above 
explanation,  a hypothesis is formulated as follows: 
 
H2a:  The stock prices of some companies that do not receive GCO (rival firms) 
increase if other companies in the same industry receive GCO 
 
2.2.4 GCO, Stock Price of Rival Firms and Auditor Reputation 
Accordingly, the size of the accounting firm is expected to provide economic value 
for the announcing firm in that it can potentially reduce the competitive effect. In 
other words, the positive consequences to be received by a rival firm will be reduced. 
Based on the above explanation, a hypothesis is formulated as follows: 
 
H2b:  An accounting firm’s size can potentially weaken the positive effect of GCO on 
rival firms’ stock prices  
 
2.2.5 GCO and Stock Price of All Companies on a Capital Market 
Research on the consequences of GCO for the capital market as a whole is still rarely 
conducted. This is due to the difficulty in obtaining the required data. Therefore, 
Tuttle and Vanderveldes (2009) used an experimental method to manipulate GCO by 
making two experimental markets (market with GCO and market without GCO). A 
market with GCO is a capital market in which GCO is issued and market without 
GCO is a capital market in which no GCO is issued. In the market with GCO, only 
companies which receive GCO experience the fall of their stock prices. On the other 
hand, in the market without GCO, all of the companies' stock prices decline, 
regardless of whether the companies deserve the stock price decline or not.  
 
According to Blay et al. (2001), GCO becomes a tool for communicating the risk in a 
company with financial distress. If in a capital market with no GCO, the risk in the 
companies with financial distress is less adequately communicated. Investors who are 
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in the high uncertainty in the capital market have the potential to decrease the stock 
price to protect themselves from unexpected events, particularly company 
bankruptcy. Based on the above explanation, a hypothesis is formulated as follows: 
 
H3a:  The stock price of a company in a market with GCO is higher than the stock 
price of a company in a market without GCO 
  
2.2.6 GCO, Stock Price of All Companies on a Capital Market and Auditor 
Reputation 
In a market with GCO, only companies receiving GCO experience stock price fall. 
On the other hand, in a market without GCO, all companies’ stock prices  decline, 
regardless of whether the companies deserve the stock price fall or not (Tuttle and 
Vandervelde, 2009). 
 
The research conducted by Tuttle and Vandervelde (2009) has not considered a 
potentially moderating variable that can strengthen the ability of GCO in stabilizing 
stock prices. The moderating variable used in this study is auditor reputation that will 
be proxied with the size of an accounting firm. Big four accounting firms can be said 
to be superior to non-big four accounting firms. It can be seen from their better 
resources, better technology audits, and better motivation to work with a high level of 
professionalism (Sawan and Alsaqqa, 2013). Based on the above explanation, a 
hypothesis is formulated as follows: 
 
H3b:  Accounting firm size can potentially strengthen the positive effect of GCO on 
stock prices at a capital market 
 
2.2.7 GCO and the Composite Index 
The composite index covers overall price movements of common stocks and 
preferred stock prices (Susanto and Sabardi, 2010). In a capital market with lower 
uncertainty, the stock prices in the market with GCO will be higher than the stock 
prices in the market without GCO. This is consistent with the results of Akerlof’s 
research (1970) which stated that a market participant in a high uncertainty condition 
tends not to be willing to buy products at high prices. It can be said that the 
movement of the stock prices in a market with GCO will be more positive than the 
stock price movement in a market without GCO. In other words, a market with GCO 
has a higher composite index than the market without GCO. Based on the above 
explanation, a hypothesis is formulated as follows: 
 
H3c: The composite index in the market with GCO is higher compared with the 
composite index in the market without GCO 
 
2.2.8 GCO, Composite Index, and the Auditor Reputation 
Based on the research conducted by Tuttle and Vandervelde (2009), in a market with 
GCO only companies with GCO experience stock price fall. The research conducted 
by Tuttle and Vandervelde (2009) has not considered a potential moderating variable 
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which can strengthen the ability of GCO in stabilizing stock prices. A moderating 
variable used in this study is auditor reputation that is proxied with the accounting 
firm size. Big four accounting firms can be said to be superior to non-big four 
accounting firms. Thus, the size of an accounting firm is expected to provide 
economic value for a capital market. The economic value potentially produces a 
higher composite index in a market with GCO. Based on the above explanation, a 
hypothesis is formulated as follows: 
 
H3d:  Accounting firm size can strengthen the positive effect of GCO on the 
composite index  
 
2.2.9 GCO and Market Participant 
According to Blay et al. (2001), GCO functions a tool for communicating the risk of 
a company which is experiencing financial distress. If in a capital market without 
GCO, the risk owned by the companies experiencing financial distress is less 
adequately communicated. Investors have different risk preference, so  their 
willingness to participate in an uncertain capital market also varies (Vovchenko et 
al., 2016; 2017). Based on the research conducted by Tuttle and Vandervelde 
(2009), the number of market participants can decrease if the uncertainty is higher. 
Based on the above explanation, a hypothesis is formulated as follows: 
 
H3e: Market participant's willingness to participate again in a market with GCO is 
higher than their willingness to participate again a market without GCO 
 
2.2.10 GCO, Market Participants, and Auditor Reputation 
Based on the research conducted by Tuttle and Vandervelde (2009), the uncertainty 
in a market without GCO is higher than that in a market with GCO. The research 
conducted by Tuttle and Vandervelde (2009) has not considered a potential 
moderating variable that can strengthen the ability of GCO in stabilizing stock prices. 
A moderating variable used in this study is auditor reputation that is proxied with the 
accounting firm size. Big four accounting firms can be said to be superior to non-big 
four accounting firms. It can be seen from their better resources, better technology 
audits, and better motivation to work with a high level of professionalism (Sawan and 
Alsaqqa, 2013). Thus, the size of the accounting firm is expected to provide 
economic value for a capital market by increasing market participant's willingness to 
participate again in the market with GCO. Based on the above explanation, a 
hypothesis is formulated as follows: 
 
H3f: Accounting firm size can strengthen the positive effect of GCO on the market 
participants  
 
3. Research Methodology 
 
3.1 Experiment 
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This research is a type of laboratory experiment because undergraduate and graduate 
students who were subjected to the experiment were required to act as financial 
analysts. Each experiment subject was asked to fill one of the four cases presented 
randomly (random assignment). The experiment was carried out using a 2 x 2 
factorial design between subjects, which allows testing the main effects and 
interaction effects (Zikmund, 2003). The design of the experiment is presented in 
Table 1. This study modifies the experimental instrument developed by O’Reilly et 
al. (2006), Tuttle and Vandervelde (2009), and O'Reilly (2010). The experimental 
subjects were asked to estimate the stock price of 40 fictional companies that were 
grouped into four industries (Industry 1, 2, 3, and 4). The subjects were asked to 
estimate the stock price at Time 1 (after being given information about the type of 
audit opinion and the accounting firms that audited the fictional company) on a scale 
of 10 points. After reading the experimental instruments, the experimental subjects 
were asked to answer questions of  manipulation check to determine the experimental 
subjects' understanding of the cases presented to them. There were two manipulation 
checks, namely the question of the level of uncertainty in the capital markets and the 
question of the level of the accounting firm’s reputation. 
 
Table 1. 2 x 2 Between-Subject Factorial Designs 
 
3.2 Research Model, Operational Definition and Measurement of Variables 
 
Figure 1 shows the research model used to test the consequences of GCO for 
announcing firms. 
 
Figure 1. Research Model to Test GCO Consequences for Announcing Firms 
H1a 
 
              H1b 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 shows the variables, operational definitions of variables and variables 
measurement to test the consequences of GCO for announcing firms. 
 
Table 2. Variables, Operational Definition and Measurement 
Variable Operational Definition Measurement 
GCO An opinion that is issued 
when the auditor doubts the 
Code 1 if the company receives GCO and code 0 
if the company receives an unqualified opinion  
Treatments 
GCO 
No Yes 
Accounting Firm Size 
Non-big four Case 1 Case 2 
Big four Case 3 Case 4 
Going Concern 
Opinion (GCO)  
Stock Price of 
Announcing 
Firms  
(SPA) 
 Accounting Firm Size 
(AFS) 
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viability of the entity 
AFS Accounting firm which has 
better resources, better 
technology audits, and better 
motivation 
Code 1 if there is a big-four accounting firm and 
code 0 if there is no big-four accounting firm. 
 
SPA The stock price of the 
company which receives 
GCO (announcing firm) 
Scales of 1 to 10. Scales of 1 to 5 show decline in 
stock prices, while the scales of 6 to 10 show the 
increase in stock prices  
 
Figure 2 shows the research model used to test the consequences of GCO for rival 
firms. 
 
Figure 2. Research Model to Test GCO Consequences for Rival Firms 
 
 
H2a 
 
         H2b 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 shows the variables, operational definitions of variables and variables 
measurement to test the consequences of GCO for rival firms. 
 
Table 3. Variables, Operational Definition and Measurement 
Variables Operational Definition Measurement 
GCO An opinion that is issued when 
the auditor doubts the viability 
of the entity 
Codes 1, 2, 3, and 4 if in the industry, there 
are 2, 4, 6, and 8 GCOs 
AFS Accounting firm which has 
better resources, better 
technology audits, and better 
motivation 
Code 1 if there is a big-four accounting firm 
and code 0 if there is no big-four accounting 
firm. 
SPR The stock price of the 
companies which do not receive 
GCO (rival firms)  
Scales of 1 to 10. Scales of 1 to 5 shows the 
decline in stock prices, while the scales of 6 
to 10 shows the increase in stock prices  
 
Figure 3 shows the research model used to test the consequences of GCO for the 
capital market. 
 
 
 
Going Consern 
Opinion (GCO) 
Stock Price 
of Rival 
Firms 
(SPR) 
Accounting 
Firm Size 
(AFS) 
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Figure 3. Research Model to Test GCO Consequences for Capital Market 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 shows the variables, operational definitions of variables and variables 
measurement to test the GCO consequences for capital markets. 
 
Table 4. Variables, Operational Definition and Measurement 
Variable Operational Definition  Measurement 
GCO An opinion that is issued when 
the auditor doubts the viability 
of the entity 
Code 1 if there is a GCO in the capital 
markets and the code of 0 if there is no GCO 
in the capital markets 
AFS Accounting firm which has 
better resources, better 
technology audits, and better 
motivation 
Code 1 if there is a big-four accounting firm 
and code 0 if there is no big-four accounting 
firm. 
SPC Stock prices across the 
companies in both 
experimental markets 
The natural logarithm of the average stock 
price Time 1 each subject experiment 
COM The movement of all stock 
prices  
 
LN{CSPIt = Market Valuet x 100%} 
                         Base Value 
 
 
MAR The parties participating in a Scales of 1 to 10. Scales of 1 to 5 shows 
H3e 
H3f 
H3d 
H3b Composite  
Index  
(COM) 
 
Going Concern  
Opinion  
(GCO) 
Accounting 
Firm Size 
(AFS) 
 
H3a 
H3c 
Stock Price of All  
Companies 
(SPC) 
Market  
Participants  
(MAR) 
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capital market unwillingness to participate, while the scales 
of 6 to 10 show willingness to participate in 
the capital markets. 
CSPI= Composite Stock Price Index 
 
3.3 Data Analysis Methods 
 
The methods of analysis used in this research are a descriptive statistical analysis, 
ANOVA with Two-Way Interaction, and MANOVA with Interaction. ANOVA is 
used to test H1a, H1b, H2a and H2b. MANOVA is used to test H3a up to H3f. 
 
4. Data Analysis and Discussion 
 
4.1 Pilot Test Results  
 
The pilot test in this study involved three undergraduate students and nine graduate 
students of STIE YKPN Yogyakarta (YKPN Business School). After the subjects 
finished working on the case, the subjects were asked to rate the level of clarity of the 
presentation of the case (scale 1 to 10). Measuring the level of clarity of the 
presentation of an experimental case like this was also conducted by 
Qimyatussa’adah et al. (2013). On average, the subjects of the pilot test gave a value 
of 8, meaning that the presentation of the case of the experiment was quite clear. 
 
4.2 Demographic Characteristics of the Experiment Subjects  
 
There were 41 YKPN Business School students (19 males and 22 females) who 
participated in this experiment: The average age of the subjects was 22.6 years. 
Overall, cases 1, 2, 3, and 4, which were filled up by the subjects of the experiment, 
had comparable amounts. 
 
4.3  Results of Manipulation Check 
 
There were 41 experimental subjects who answered manipulation check correctly and 
only 3 subjects did not answer the manipulation check correctly. The experimental 
subjects who did not correctly answer manipulation check were excluded from 
further testing. 
  
4.4 Descriptive Statistical Analysis 
 
Based on the results of the descriptive analysis, the average stock price of 
announcing firms was lower if the announcing firms were audited by big-four 
accounting firms. The rival firms’ stock prices were higher if the companies  
receiving GCO were audited by big-four accounting firms. In addition, the average 
stock price of all companies, the average composite index, and the average market 
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participant in the market with GCO were better than those in the market without 
GCO. The descriptive statistics are presented in Table 5. 
 
Table 5. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable 
Experimental Market 
Market With GCO Market Without GCO 
Min Max Mean Min Max Mean 
HSA (Rp) All Accounting 
Firms 
40 13600 2434 
- - - 
Big four 40 13600 2544 - - - 
Non-big four 40 12000 2324 - - - 
HSA (%) All Accounting 
Firms 
-28 36 -2,4 
- - - 
Big four -28 36 -0,4 - - - 
Non-big four -20 20 -4 - - - 
HSR (Rp) All Accounting 
Firms 
130 13600 3931 
- - - 
Big four 130 13600 3931 - - - 
Non-big four 144 12000 3837 - - - 
HSR (%) All Accounting 
Firms 
-28 36 11 
- - - 
Big four -28 36 19 - - - 
Non-big four -20 20 3 - - - 
HSS (Rp) All Accounting 
Firms 
1966 2794 2432 1430 2165 1862 
Big four 2336 2794 2550 1902 2165 2035 
Non-big four 1966 2564 2315 1430 1931 1688 
COM All Accounting 
Firms 
76 141 114 76 101 87 
Big four 114 135 127 89 101 95 
Non-big four 76 141 101 76 93 80 
MAR All Accounting 
Firms 
5 10 8 2 6 4 
Big four 5 10 7 3 6 4 
Non-big four 6 9 8 2 6 4 
Source: The data processing 
 
4.5 Assumptions Testing of Two-Way ANOVA with Interaction and MANOVA 
with Interaction 
  
The results of testing the assumption of variance homogeneity using Levene's Test 
showed that the variance was not homogeneous (Gastwirth et al., 2009). According 
to Frutos (2009), Gastwirth et al. (2009), and Ghozali (2011), although it did not 
meet the assumption of variance homogeneity, the ANOVA analysis was still 
possible  to run because ANOVA is robust for the irregularity assumption of 
homogeneity from small to moderate levels. The test results of the covariance matrix 
using Box'M Test showed that the covariance matrix was homogeneous. The results 
of variance error homogeneity testing using Levene's test indicate that the variance 
error of all groups was homogeneous. The results of  the data normality test using the 
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Shapiro-Wilk indicate that the data are not normally distributed. According to 
Ghozali (2011), although it did not meet the assumptions of data normality,  the 
ANOVA and MANOVA analyses were still possible  to run because the ANOVA 
and MANOVA tests are robust for the deviations of normality assumption from small 
to moderate levels. 
 
4.6 Testing Hypotheses and Discussion 
 
4.6.1 GCO Consequences for Announcing firms 
Hypothesis 1a that states the stock-price estimation of announcing firms made by the 
financial analysts is lower when the auditor issues GCO than when the auditor issues 
an unqualified opinion is accepted as the significance of the F value at the GCO is 
0.000 (less than 5%). This suggests that announcing firms obtain the negative 
consequences of the GCO it receives. This result is consistent with the results of the 
research conducted by Elliott et al. (2006); Schaub (2006); O’Reilly et al. (2006); 
O'Reilly (2010); Carson et al. (2012); Coelho et al. (2012) and Amin et al. (2014). 
 
Table 6. Average Stock Price Change and Average Stock Price Time 1 
Audit 
Opinion 
Accounting Firms 
Average Stock Price 
Change (%) 
Average Stock 
Price Time 1 
(Rp) 
Unqualified 
Opinion 
All Accounting Firms 11 4.112 
Big four 19 4.387 
Non-big four 3 3.837 
GCO All Accounting Firms -16 756 
Big four -20 701 
Non-big four -12 812 
 
The comparison of the stock price change average and the stock price average of 
Time 1 is presented in Table 6. Based on this table, the companies which receive 
GCO experienced a 16% decrease in the stock price average. On the other hand, 
companies that receive  an unqualified opinion experienced a 11%  increase in their 
stock price average.  Based on the table, the average stock-price estimation of Time 1 
(Rp4.112) made by the experimental subjects is higher when the companies received 
an unqualified opinion than that when the companies received GCO (Rp756). 
 
Hypothesis 1b which states that the size of the accounting firm can weaken the 
negative effect of GCO on the stock prices of the announcing firm cannot be 
accepted.. Although the significance value of F at the GCO*AFS was 0.000 (less 
than 5%), but the percentage decline of the stock price of announcing firms audited 
by big-four accounting firms was higher than the percentage decline of the stock 
price of announcing firms audited by non-big four accounting firms. This suggests 
that the presence of big-four accounting firms does not weaken the negative 
consequences of GCO to announcing firms’ stock prices. In other words, the 
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hypothesis testing results proved that the existence of big four accounting firms 
amplifies the negative consequences of GCO to announcing firms’ stock prices. 
 
Based on Table 6, the announcing firms audited by the big-four accounting firms 
experienced greater stock price declines than the announcing firms audited by the 
non-big four accounting firms. The average decline of stock prices of announcing 
firms audited by big- four accounting firms was 20%, while the average decline of 
stock prices of announcing firms audited by non-big four accounting firms amounted 
only to 12%. In addition, the average stock price of the Time 1 of the announcing 
firms audited by big-four accounting firms was lower than the average stock price of 
the Time 1 of the announcing firms audited by non-big four accounting firms. The 
average stock price of the Time 1of the announcing firms audited by big-four 
accounting firms amounted to Rp701, while the average stock price of the Time 1 of 
the announcing firms audited by non-big four accounting firms amounted to Rp812. 
 
The table also indicates that the presence of big-four accounting firm can amplify the 
negative consequences of GCO to announcing firms’ stock price. This can be so 
because the GCO is issued by the well-reputed accounting firms are considered to 
have a higher accuracy rate than the GCO issued by the accounting firms whose 
reputation is lower (DeAngelo, 1981; Geiger and Rama, 2006; Hapsoro and Aghasta, 
2013; Myers et al., 2014; Theriou et al., 2014; Theriou and Aggelidis, 2014). Big-
four accounting firms can be said to be superior to non-big four accounting firms. It 
can be seen from their better resources, better technology audits, and better 
motivation to work with a high level of professionalism (Sawan and Alsaqqa, 2013). 
GCO that has a high degree of accuracy can be an early warning for company 
bankruptcy. It is then reacted negatively by the decline of the stock prices. 
 
The testing results of hypothesis 1 (GCO consequences for announcing firms) are 
shown in Table 8. 
 
Table 8. Results of Hypothesis Testing 1 (GCO Consequences for Announcing 
Firms) 
Source Type III Sum of 
Squares 
Df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 33,672
a
 3 11,224 380,222 ,000 
Intercept ,659 1 ,659 22,336 ,000 
GCO_1 28,983 1 28,983 981,800 ,000 
SPE_1 ,192 1 ,192 6,513 ,011 
GCO_1 * SPE_1 2,891 1 2,891 97,938 ,000 
Error 61,283 2076 ,030   
Total 95,565 2080    
Corrected Total 94,955 2079    
Dependent Variable: SPA 
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4.6.2 GCO Consequences for Rival firms 
Hypothesis 2a which states that the stock prices of companies not receiving GCO 
(rival firms) increases if other companies in the same industry receive GCO is 
accepted because the significance of the F value of the GCO is 0.000 (less than 5%). 
The result is consistent with the results of the researches conducted by Elliot et al. 
(2006) and Coelho et al. (2012). The experimental market in this study consisted of 
four industries (Industry 1, Industry 2, Industry 3, and Industry 4). Every industry 
consisted of 10 fictional companies. The numbers of announcing firms in each 
industry are respectively two, four, six, and eight, while the numbers of the rival 
firms in each industry are respectively eight, six, four and two. The comparison of the 
averages of stock price changes and the average stock prices of Time 1 is presented 
in Table 7. 
 
Table 7. Average Stock Price Change and Average Stock Price Time 1 
Industry 
The 
Number 
of  GCO 
Accounting Firms 
Average 
Stock Price 
Change (%) 
Average of 
Stock Price 
Time 1 (Rp) 
1 2 GCO All Accounting Firms 26 6.906 
Big four 36 7.395 
Non-big four 16 6.416 
2 4 GCO All Accounting Firms 18 2.532 
Big four 28 2.714 
Non-big four 8 2.351 
3 6 GCO All Accounting Firms -11 2.610 
Big four -4 2.754 
Non-big four -18 2.466 
4 8 GCO All Accounting Firms -24 680 
Big four -28 644 
Non-big four -20 766 
 
Based on Table 7, Industry 1 (with  2 GCOs) experienced a stock price increase of 
26%, while Industry 2 (with 4 GCOs) experienced a stock price increase of 18%. It 
can be said that in Industry 1 and Industry 2 the competitive effect took place because 
the rival firms’ stock price rose. Industry 3 (with 6 GCOs) experienced a stock price 
decline of 11%, while Industry 4 (with 8 GCOs) experienced a stock price decline of 
24%. It can be said that  in Industry 3 and Industry 4 the contagion effect took place 
because the rival firms experienced a decline in stock prices. These results prove that 
the competitive effect can be turned into a contagion effect if the number of the 
announcing firms is higher than the number of the rival firms. 
 
Hypothesis 2b which states that the size of an accounting firm can weaken the GCO 
positive effect on the stock prices of the rival firms cannot be accepted. Although the 
obtained value of F at the GCO*AFS is 0.000 (less than 5%), but the increase 
percentage in the stock prices of the rival firms are higher when the announcing firms 
are audited by big-four accounting firms than when the announcing firms are audited 
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by non-big four accounting firms. This suggests that the presence of big four 
accounting firm does not weaken the positive consequences of GCO to announcing 
firms’ stock prices. In other words, the test results of the hypothesis prove that the 
presence of big-four accounting firms has the role in strengthening the positive 
consequences of GCO to the rival firms’ stock prices. 
 
Based on Table 7, in Industry 1 and Industry 2, the increase of the rival firms’ stock 
prices is higher when the announcing firms are audited by big-four accounting firms 
than when the announcing firms are audited by non-big four accounting firms. The 
increases of rival firms’ stock prices in Industry 1 and Industry 2 audited by big-four 
accounting firms were respectively 36% and 28%, while the increases of the rival 
firms’ stock prices of Industry 1 and Industry 2 audited by non-big four accounting 
firms were respectively 16% and 8%. On the other hand, the decline in rival firms’ 
stock prices in Industry 3 and Industry 4 audited by big-four accounting firms were 
respectively at 4% and 28%, while the decline in the rival firms’ stock prices in 
Industry 3 and Industry 4 audited by non-big four accounting firms were respectively 
18% and 20%. 
 
The table indicates that the presence of big four accounting firms can strengthen the 
positive consequences of GCO to the rival firms’ stock prices. This is because the 
GCO issued by well-reputed accounting firms have a higher accuracy rate than the 
GCO issued by firms of lower reputation (DeAngelo, 1981; Geiger and Rama, 2006; 
Hapsoro and Aghasta, 2013; Myers et al., 2014). GCO that has a high degree of 
accuracy can be an early warning of company bankruptcy. Then, the stakeholders of 
the companies that could potentially go bankrupt (announcing firms) will be more 
motivated to move the focus of their business to other companies which are in the 
same industry (rival firms). The testing results for hypothesis  2 (GCO consequences 
for rival firms) are shown in Table 9. 
 
Table 9. Results of Hypothesis Testing 2 (GCO Consequences for Rival Firms) 
Source Type III Sum of 
Squares 
Df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 25,827
a
 7 3,690 271,031 ,000 
Intercept ,616 1 ,616 45,262 ,000 
GCO_2 21,309 3 7,103 521,790 ,000 
SPE_2 ,580 1 ,580 42,595 ,000 
GCO_2 * SPE_2 1,381 3 ,460 33,814 ,000 
Error 14,049 1032 ,014   
Total 51,008 1040    
Corrected Total 39,876 1039    
Dependent Variable: SPR 
 
4.6.3 GCO Consequences for Capital Market 
Hypothesis 3a which states that the stock prices of companies in a market with GCO 
is higher than the stock prices of companies in a market without GCO is accepted 
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because the significance of the F value at GCO of dependent variable SPC is 0.000 
(less than 5%). The comparison of the average stock prices of all companies in both 
experimental markets is presented in Table 5. Based on this table, the average stock 
price of all companies in the market with GCO is higher than the average stock price 
of all companies in the market without GCO. The average stock price of all 
companies in the market with GCO is Rp2.432, while the average stock price of all 
companies in the market without GCO is Rp1.862. This suggests that the presence of 
GCO in a capital market can raise the stock price of all companies. The existence of 
GCO can minimize the uncertain condition in a capital market. 
 
Hypothesis 3b which states that the size of an accounting firm can strengthen the 
positive effect of GCO to the stock price in a capital market is accepted as the 
significance of the F value at the GCO*AFS for the dependent variable SPC (the 
average stock price of all companies) is 0.000 (less than 5%). These results indicate 
that the stock prices of companies in the market with GCO are higher than the stock 
prices of companies in the market without GCO. Thus, the presence of big four 
accounting firms can strengthen the positive effect of GCO on the stock prices in a 
capital market. 
 
Table 5 illustrates the role of the big-four accounting firms in a capital market. The 
average stock price of all companies will be higher in the capital market with big four 
accounting firms than the average stock price of all companies in the capital market 
with no big-four accounting firms. The average stock price of all companies in the 
market with GCO issued by big-four accounting firms is Rp2.550, while the average 
stock price of all companies in the market with GCO issued by non-big four 
accounting firms are only Rp2.315. The average stock price of all companies in the 
market without GCO issued by big four accounting firms is by Rp2.035, while the 
average price of all companies in the capital market without GCO issued by non-big 
four accounting firms are only Rp1.688. It can be said that the big-four accounting 
firms can strengthen the positive consequences of GCO in a capital market. 
 
Hypothesis 3c which states that the composite index is higher in the market with 
GCO than the composite index in the market without GCO is accepted as the 
significance of the F value at the GCO for the dependent variable COM (composite 
index) is 0.000 (less than 5%). The comparison of the average composite index in 
both experimental markets is presented in Table 5. Based on this table, the average 
composite index in a market with GCO is higher than the average composite index in 
a market without GCO. The average composite index in a market with GCO is 114, 
while the average composite index on the market without GCO is only 87. This 
shows that the presence of GCO in a capital market may lead to higher composite 
index.  
 
Hypothesis 3d which states that the size of an accounting firm can strengthen the 
positive effect of GCO on the composite index is accepted because the significance 
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of the F value at the GCO*AFS for the dependent variable of COM (composite 
index) is 0.095 (less than 10%). This result indicates that the composite index in a 
market with GCO is higher than the composite index in a market without GCO. Thus, 
the presence of big-four accounting firms can strengthen positive effect of GCO on 
the composite index in a capital market. 
 
Table 5 illustrates the role of the big four accounting firms in a capital markets. The 
average composite index will be higher in the capital market with big-four 
accounting firms than the average composite index in the capital market without big-
four accounting firms. The average composite index in a market with GCO issued by 
big-four accounting firms is 127, while the average composite index in a market with 
GCO issued by non-big four accounting firms are only 101. On the other hand, the 
average composite index in a market without GCO issued by big-four accounting 
firms is 95, while the average composite index in a market without GCO issued by 
non-big four accounting firms are only 80. It can be said that big-four accounting 
firms can strengthen the positive consequences of GCO on a capital market. 
 
Hypothesis 3e, which states that the number of market participants in a market with 
GCO is higher than  the number of market participants in a market without GCO is 
accepted because the significance of the F value  at the GCO for the dependent 
variable MAR (market participant) is 0.000 (less than 5%). The level of uncertainty 
in the market without GCO is higher than the level of uncertainty in the market with 
GCO. If in a capital market, there are no companies that receive GCO, then the 
investor is difficult to identify companies whose survival are in doubt. Based on these 
results, the market participants are willing to participate in the capital market with 
GCO because the uncertainty is lower. 
 
The comparison of the average market participation in both experimental markets is 
presented in Table 5. Market participation is measured using a scale of 10 points. The 
lowest figure 1 shows that after observing the condition of the capital markets, a 
market participant is not willing to participate in the capital markets. The highest 
figure 10 shows that after observing the condition of the capital markets, a market 
participant is willing to participate in capital markets. Based on the table, the average 
level of willingness to participate in the market without GCO is equal to 4 and the 
average level of willingness to participate in the market with GCO is equal to 7. This 
suggests that the presence of GCO in a capital market can increase the willingness to 
participate in the capital markets. The existence of GCO can minimize uncertainty in 
the capital markets so that the willingness to participate in a market with GCO is 
higher than the willingness to participate in a  market without GCO. 
 
Hypothesis 3f which states that the size of an accounting firm can strengthen the 
GCO positive effect on the market participants in a capital market is acceptable 
because the significance of the F value at the GCO*AFS for the dependent variable 
MAR (market participant) is 0.662 (higher than 5%). Based on this result, the market 
participant is willing to participate in a capital market with GCO because uncertainty 
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is lower. However, the presence of big-four accounting firms has not been proven to 
significantly strengthen the positive effect of GCO on the market participants in a 
capital market. 
 
Table 5 illustrates the role of the big-four accounting firms in a capital market. The 
average level of willingness to participate in a capital market with big-four 
accounting firms higher than that in a capital market without big-four accounting 
firms. The average level of willingness to participate in a market with GCO issued by 
big-four accounting firms is 7, while the average level of willingness to participate in 
a market with GCO issued by non-big four accounting firms is  8. On the other hand, 
the level of willingness to participate in a market without GCO issued by big-four 
accounting firms is 4, while the average level of willingness to participate in a market 
without GCO issued by non-big four accounting firms is also 4. It can be said that the 
presence of big-four accounting firms is not proven  to strengthen the positive 
consequences of GCO of a capital market. The testing results of hypothesis3 (GCO 
consequences for capital markets) are shown in Table 10. 
 
Accounting firm size is only one dimension of auditor reputation. There are other 
dimensions of the auditor's reputation, for example, the auditor industry 
specialization. An accounting firm focusing on a particular industry has a deeper 
understanding than that does not focus on specific industries. Specialized-industry 
accounting firms are not always big- four accounting firms; second-tier and third-tier 
accounting firm are also capable of being specialists. This could explain why the 
dichotomy of big-four accounting firms and non-big four accounting firms do not 
lead to the increase of the willingness of market participants to participate again in a 
capital market. 
 
Table 10. Results of Hypothesis Testing 3 (GCO Consequences for Capital Markets) 
Source Dependent 
Variable 
Type III Sum 
of Squares 
Df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Corrected Model 
SPC_LN 2,683
a
 3 ,894 408,734 ,000 
COM_LN 3,568
b
 3 1,189 417,550 ,000 
MAR 462,323
c
 3 154,108 93,425 ,000 
Intercept 
SPC_LN 6236,245 1 6236,245 2850040,144 ,000 
COM_LN 2263,841 1 2263,841 794873,811 ,000 
MAR 3140,823 1 3140,823 1904,073 ,000 
GCO_3 
SPC_LN 2,103 1 2,103 961,194 ,000 
COM_LN 3,031 1 3,031 1064,079 ,000 
MAR 340,907 1 340,907 206,669 ,000 
SPE_3 
SPC_LN ,534 1 ,534 243,826 ,000 
COM_LN ,597 1 ,597 209,444 ,000 
MAR 3,995 1 3,995 2,422 ,123 
GCO_3 * SPE_3 
SPC_LN ,098 1 ,098 44,984 ,000 
COM_LN ,031 1 ,031 10,890 ,001 
MAR 102,766 1 102,766 62,300 ,000 
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Error 
SPC_LN ,225 103 ,002   
COM_LN ,293 103 ,003   
MAR 169,901 103 1,650   
Total 
SPC_LN 6256,790 107    
COM_LN 2270,837 107    
MAR 3787,000 107    
Corrected Total 
SPC_LN 2,908 106    
COM_LN 3,861 106    
MAR 632,224 106    
 
5. Closing 
 
5.1 Conclusion 
 
GCO consequences for announcing firms is that the stock prices of announcing firms 
will decline. The decline will be greater if the announcing firms are audited by big-
four accounting firms. The GCO consequence for rival firms is that the stock prices 
of rival firms will increase if some companies in the same industry receive GCO. The 
increase of the stock prices will be greater if the companies with GCO are audited by 
big-four accounting firms. The GCO consequence of the capital market is that the 
stock prices of all companies and the composite index will be higher. However, the 
existence of big four accounting firm has not been proven to increase the willingness 
of market participant to participate again in the capital market. 
 
5.2 Limitations and Suggestions 
 
This study has at least four limitations. First, the subjects of this experiment were not 
financial analysts, but students were asked to act as financial analysts. Future studies 
are expected to use real financial analysts as subjects of experiments so that the 
results of the estimation of stock-prices can be more accounted for. Second, the 
preparation of experimental instrument was quite difficult because there had been no 
previous studies that simultaneously observed the consequences of GCO for 
announcing firms, rival firms, and capital markets. Future studies are expected to 
conduct more consultation with the parties who are experts in the preparation of the 
experimental instruments. Third, there is only one auditor reputation proxy used in 
this study, namely the size of an accounting firm. Future studies are expected to add 
other proxies for auditor reputation, such as the industry specialization of an 
accounting firm and the tested experience of an accounting firm as shown by its 
establishment year.  
 
5.3 Implications 
 
Unlike an unqualified opinion that is expected by of all parties, GCO is an unpopular 
opinion because it reflects considerable doubt upon an entity's ability to maintain its 
viability. However, if there is no GCO in a capital market, companies’ stock prices, 
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the composite index, and the market participants in the capital markets will tend to be 
low. This shows that GCO is good news for a capital market.  
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